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Putting Transitional Justice on Trial:  
Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Civil War Societies 
 
 Governments emerging from civil wars often have to decide how to deal with past 
atrocities as they attempt to build a stable democratic society. These are issues of “transitional 
justice,” defined by the International Center for Transitional Justice as “the set of judicial and 
non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the 
legacies of massive human rights abuses.”1 States in democratic transitions are increasingly 
turning to transitional justice mechanisms (TJMs), such as war crimes tribunals, truth 
commissions, reparations, and amnesty. Advocates of TJMs consistently argue that they are a 
necessary component of a successful democratization process. However, few cross-national 
empirical studies exist to evaluate these claims. 
 In addition to an overall claim that TJMs facilitate democratic transitions, the advocates 
of TJMs also debate whether truth commissions or tribunals are the more effective mechanism. 
Advocates of truth commissions argue that they have multiple advantages: they give a voice to 
the victims of abuse, help a society understand and acknowledge its past, bring accountability to 
political institutions, increase future support for human rights, restore trust in post-conflict 
societies, and help create the conditions for future democratization. Advocates of tribunals 
criticize truth commissions as “compromise justice.” They argue that only tribunals hold 
perpetrators accountable for their crimes, affirm that the victims do indeed have fundamental 
rights, and deter those who might consider such actions in the future. Again, few cross-national 
empirical studies exist to evaluate these claims. 
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  The democratic transition literature includes countries with authoritarian governments 
and civil wars in their past. This paper tests claims made in the democratic transition literature in 
perhaps the ‘harder’ cases of post-civil war countries only. It analyzes the influence of TJMs on 
countries going through post-civil war democratic transitions. It compares current levels of 
human rights and democratization in post-civil war societies that have used TJMs with societies 
that have not. It also evaluates the levels of human rights and democratization in post-civil war 
societies that have used war crimes tribunals with post-civil war societies that have used truth 
commissions. These results support many of the arguments in the transitional justice literature: 
post-civil war societies that have used TJMs have higher levels of democratization and human 
rights than those that did not. The results are only significant, however, for war crimes tribunals. 
There was no statistical difference between countries that used truth commissions and countries 
that did not.  
 
Transitional Justice 
The transitional justice literature is vast, and no attempt is made to comprehensively 
review it here.2 This literature is a subset of the democratic transition literature, which began 
after a series of regime changes in Latin America in the 1980s. Much of the literature emphasizes 
the historic events in South Africa and then Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 
the post-cold war era, the focus includes post-conflict societies as the number of civil wars – and 
the amount of international intervention – has increased. A consistent theme in this literature is to 
explain how TJMs can help facilitate democratic transitions. The following is a typical passage: 
There are four basic objectives of any transitional justice program…the first is to 
determine the truth by establishing a record of human rights abuses. Truth 
provides validation for victims and is aimed at the instruction of future 
generations. The second objective is justice. The third is meaningful democratic 
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reform, entrenchment of the rule of law within society, and building a society 
with institutions that ensure that the kinds of abuses being dealt with will not 
recur. The fourth objective is a durable peace with assurance that a return to 
violence is fairly unlikely…these four objectives are the standards by which all 
transitional justice programs should be evaluated.3  
 
The literature clearly asserts an expectation that TJMs will increase levels of democratization 
and human rights in post-civil war countries. Some authors explicitly argue that the way to 
evaluate the success of truth commissions, a particularly important TJM, is to analyze future 
levels of human rights and democratization.4 
Most empirical analyses in the literature, though, are case studies rather than cross-
national studies. There are few cross-national empirical studies testing the claims that TJMs do 
indeed facilitate democratic transitions.5 There is also little longitudinal data of political and 
cultural beliefs before and after the initiation of transitional justice mechanisms. A recent review 
of this literature concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support any strong claims in this 
area.6 
The few studies that do exist show mixed results. Eric Brahm finds no difference in the 
levels of democracy between transitioning countries that have used truth commissions and those 
that have not.7 Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter find in their study of counties in 
democratic transitions, that no one mechanism, when used alone, improves human rights.8 
Indeed, they argue that truth commissions, when used alone, had a negative impact on human 
rights. Only when TJMs were used in combination did they have a positive impact. Kathryn 
Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling created an original dataset of truth commissions and trials in 
Latin America, an analysis of which led them to conclude that human rights trials have a positive 
effect on human rights, conflict resolution, democracy, and rule of law.9 In the most extensive 
study of its kind, Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink look at 100 transitional countries and also 
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find that trials lead to improvements in human rights. They argue that trials have more influence 
than truth commissions because trials combine normative pressures and material punishment 
while truth commissions do not include material punishment.10 
Another feature of the transitional justice literature is a debate about the relative worth of 
truth commissions versus tribunals. Underlying this debate is a theoretical argument that 
countries must choose between post-conflict goals of justice or peace.11 Should a country 
prioritize goals like justice, accountability, deterrence, and the rule of law regarding human 
rights by using TJMs like tribunals and reparations? Or should a country prioritize goals like 
peace, healing, and reconciliation by using TJMs like truth commissions and amnesty? Should a 
country punish previous human rights violators and provide reparations to victims, or should a 
country seek truth and acknowledgement of past atrocities as the proper first step to build a 
stable post-conflict society? 
Truth commissions investigate the alleged atrocities of past warring parties and/or a 
previous regime, issue a report of their findings, and often make recommendations to prevent 
future abuses. Advocates of truth commissions argue that they give a voice to the victims of 
abuse and help a society understand and acknowledge its past.12 Supporters also cite the 
therapeutic value for victims of truth telling and receiving acknowledgement from the state of 
their suffering. Truth commissions incorporate a greater range of victims than tribunals and take 
a broad view of society that enables them to recommend institutional changes to prevent future 
atrocities. Overall, the argument is that truth commissions bring accountability to political 
institutions, increase future support for human rights, restore trust in post-conflict societies, and 
help create the conditions for future democratization.13 
4
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Truth commission advocates prefer them to tribunals because they are more likely to 
facilitate the necessary political and cultural change for reconciliation by focusing on underlying 
causes of conflict and human rights abuses rather than prosecuting individuals. Truth 
commission supporters fear that the adversarial nature of trials make reconciliation less likely 
and may instead promote future violence; that trials focus on a few individuals and are less 
effective in dealing with systematic abuses; that trials may be unfair if the abuses occurred many 
years ago or if only lower level perpetrators rather than the leadership are tried; and that trials 
may be either impractical or a farce if the perpetrators remain too influential during the 
transition.  
Advocates cite the truth commission process in South Africa to illustrate their argument. 
James Gibson, for example, generalizes from his research on South Africa and argues that truth 
commissions can lead to reconciliation, democratization, and respect for human rights.14 He 
points to “macro” factors contributing to reconciliation: a rule of law culture, political pluralism 
(competing centers of power), amnesty, and the extent of injuries perpetrated by the previous 
regime. Gibson also cites “micro” factors contributing to reconciliation: even-handedness 
(assigning blame to all sides), leadership, and societal penetration of the process.15 Such factors 
can facilitate certain components of reconciliation, he argues, including the reduction of political 
intolerance, support for human rights, institutional legitimacy, and a collective national memory. 
Some case studies of truth commissions support Gibson’s arguments. Mark Ensalaco 
argues that the truth commissions in Chile and El Salvador were successful precisely because 
they focused on reconciliation and truth rather than justice and punishment.16 Christian 
Tomuschat argues that the truth commission in Guatemala helped propel the country toward 
peace by recognizing the acts committed by all sides.17 Robert Ameh similarly argues that the 
5
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truth commission in Ghana, despite the difficulties in offering an authoritative account of the 
truth, will ultimately be successful because it did not try to place blame and create a basis for 
future trials.18 
Even accounts of unsuccessful transitions offer some support for Gibson’s viewpoint. 
Gberie Lansana argues that the truth commission in Liberia was unsuccessful because it placed 
blame only on one side and the current political leadership did not support the process – two 
factors highlighted by Gibson.19 Joseph Nevins and David Webster both argue that the 
reconciliation process in East Timor was unsuccessful because it did not grant amnesty and tried 
to prosecute offenders who had fled to Indonesia.20 Without extradition agreements from 
Indonesia, East Timor was unable to prosecute the alleged offenders, and public support for that 
approach waned. Elizabeth Evanson argues that the process in Sierra Leone failed because it 
included the use of truth commissions and tribunals concurrently, which encouraged conflict in 
the population rather than reconciliation.21 
The competing argument is that tribunals are often more effective than truth 
commissions.22 Tribunals emphasize deterrence, accountability, punishment, and the rule of law. 
Tribunals prosecute individuals for alleged acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. While some are international tribunals like those created by the Security Council to 
investigate war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, most are initiated at the nation-
state level. Advocates for tribunals argue that they are the only way to guarantee accountability 
because not all truth commissions trigger processes that lead to consequences for human rights 
violators. Similarly, amnesty programs are unacceptable to those who emphasize punishing the 
guilty.23 Proponents of this view believe truth commissions are “compromise justice” – inferior 
alternatives used when the legal system is too weak to prosecute human rights violations.24 Truth 
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commissions are considered weak because they generally have time limits, restrictions on access 
to evidence, no enforcement powers, and a poor record of implementing recommendations. 
Critics of trials argue that they are often not appropriate in delicate transition situations. 
Even the prospect of trials may undermine negotiations and present obstacles to ending 
conflict.25 Why should leaders agree to a negotiated ceasefire and a peaceful transition context if 
part of that process means they will go on trial for past atrocities? The domestic judicial system 
may not be well established to handle such controversial trials in post-civil war societies. Critics 
also argue that deterrence is unlikely because perpetrators will continue to believe that such acts 
are necessary because the future of their group’s survival is at stake. 
This debate demonstrates the tensions between peace and justice as post-conflict and/or 
democratizing goals. Pursuing peace rather than justice may seem inadequate to many if the 
process does not include the punishment of those responsible. To avoid impunity many human 
rights advocates cite the necessity of trials. Yet pursuing justice through trials can often hinder 
the long term goal of peace by alienating the supporters of the previous regime and preventing 
the development of future power sharing arrangements. Similar dynamics result from the policy 
options to grant amnesty or seek reparations. Combining truth commissions and amnesty – 
everyone admits their crimes and no one goes to jail – risks a situation in which the victimized 
groups in society do not feel that justice was done. Hence, combining trials and reparations may 
lead to resentment and animosity among the social groups privileged by the previous regime and 
prevent the reconciliation necessary for long term peace. 
Some take these tensions so seriously that they argue that TJMs are ultimately 
counterproductive. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri contend that even truth commissions – if 
they reveal individual responsibility for crimes – can potentially upset long term peace because 
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they can foster divergent interpretations of history and generate insecurity on the part of the 
alleged perpetrators.26 David Mendeloff argues that there is little empirical evidence that 
tribunals or truth commissions provide psychological or emotional benefits to victims.27 Booth 
notes that sometimes the truth causes more suffering than a forced amnesia because it removes 
the incentive for the elites of the old regime to obstruct the process.28 Janine Clark argues that 
truth commissions cannot deal with the issue of denial – for example, Serbian leaders who do not 
view their actions as harmful or criminal.29  
This article addresses these two features of the transition justice literature. It provides a 
cross-national empirical test of claims about the effectiveness of TJMs. It tests the overall claim 
in the literature: democratizing countries that use TJMs are more likely to have successful 
democratic transitions than countries that do not use TJMs. This article also addresses the debate 
within the literature about the relative effectiveness of tribunals and truth commissions. It does 
so, though, specifically for the subset of post-civil war societies and tests the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Post-civil war societies that have used TJMs have higher levels of democracy than 
post-civil war societies that have not used TJMs. 
H2: Post-civil war societies that have used TJMs have higher levels of human rights than 
post-civil war societies that have not used TJMs. 
H3: Post-civil war societies that have used tribunals have higher levels of democracy than 
post-civil war societies that have used truth commissions. 
H4: Post-civil war societies that have used tribunals have higher levels of human rights 
than post-civil war societies that have used truth commissions. 
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Analyzing the Effectiveness of TJMs 
The data used to test these hypotheses includes fifty-five countries that have experienced 
a civil war since 1980 according to the Armed Conflict Database generated by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute.30 The Transitional Justice 
Database Project was used to determine which countries used a particular TJM mechanism.31 
The countries in the study, and the TJMs mechanisms used in each, are in Table 1. The dataset 
also includes four dependent variables measuring levels of democratization and human rights and 
three control variables common in the literature that may also influence the levels of 
democratization and human rights: per capita GDP, the severity of the civil war, and the region 
of the country. 
Truth commission: This variable identifies the countries that have used a truth 
commission. Fifteen of the fifty-five countries in the dataset utilized a truth commission. 
Tribunal: This variable identifies the countries that have used a judicial tribunal. 
Twenty-seven of the fifty-five countries in the dataset utilized a war crimes tribunal. 
Democracy: This variable is based on Polity IV scores, a commonly used 20-point scale 
measuring democracy levels in countries around the world.32 
Human rights: Three indicators are used for the human rights dependent variable. The 
first is the Empowerment Rights Index from the CIRI Human Rights Data Set.33 This index 
measures government respect for foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly and association, workers’ rights, electoral self-determination, and freedom 
of religion. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full 
government respect for these seven rights). The second is the CIRI Physical Integrity Index, 
which measures the rights not to be tortured, executed, or imprisoned for one’s political beliefs. 
9
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The third is the Political Terror Scale,34 which measures levels of political violence based on 
country reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. 
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Table 1 – Post-Civil War Countries and TJMs 
Truth Commissions Only   Tribunals Only 
 Algeria     Afghanistan  
 Burundi     Bangladesh 
 Chad      Congo 
 Lebanon     Croatia 
 Morocco     El Salvador  
 Sri Lanka     Guinea Bissau 
       Haiti 
       Iraq  
       Ivory Coast 
       Liberia 
       Nicaragua 
       Peru 
       Philippines 
       Romania 
       Rwanda 
       Senegal 
       Serbia 
       Uzbekistan 
     
Neither     Both Tribunals/Truth Commissions  
 Angola     Argentina 
 Azerbaijan     Bosnia 
 Central African Republic   East Timor 
 Cambodia     Guatemala 
 Columbia     Indonesia 
 DR Congo     Nigeria 
 Georgia     Sierra Leone 
 Ethiopia     South Africa 
 Eritrea      Uganda 
 India 
 Iran 
 Mozambique      
 Myanmar      
 Nepal       
 Pakistan      
 Somalia      
 Sudan       
 Syria 
 Tajikistan 
 Thailand 
 Turkey 
 Yemen 
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The three control variables are: 1) the number of deaths within the country during the 
civil war, according to the Correlates of War Intra State War dataset;35 2) the per capita GDP of 
the country, according to the 2011 CIA Country Reports; and 3) the region of the country – 
whether the country is in Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia, or the Middle East.  
 Simple bivariate correlations provide some initial support for the four hypotheses (see 
Table 2). First, the use of a TJM was significantly correlated with all four measures of human 
rights and democratization. Second, the use of a war crimes tribunal was significantly correlated 
with all four measures of human rights and democratization. However, the use of a truth 
commission was not. While all four measures were in the hypothesized direction, none were 
statistically significant.  
 
 Table 2 – Bivariate Correlations 
 
 Country used 
TJM 
Country used war 
crimes tribunal 
Country used truth 
commission 
Political Terror Scale -.427** 
.001 
-.469** 
.000 
-.153 
.260 
Physical Integrity Index .454** 
.000 
.453** 
.001 
.178 
.195 
New Empirical Index .471** 
.000 
.445** 
.001 
.219 
.108 
Polity IV Democracy Scale .406** 
.003 
.377** 
.006 
.170 
.228 
 
 Numerous regression analyses provide further support for the hypotheses (see Table 3). 
Model 1 includes the TJM index (whether a country used either TJM mechanism) and the three 
control variables to predict the Polity IV democratization scale. Only the TJM variable was a 
significant predictor. Model 2 includes those same four independent variables predicting the 
Political Terror Scale. Both the TJM and per capita GDP variables were significant predictors. 
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Model 3 includes the same four variables predicting the CIRI Empowerment Scale. As in Model 
1, only the TJM variable was a significant predictor. Model 4 includes the four variables 
predicting the CIRI Physical Integrity Index. Once again, only the TJM variable was a significant 
predictor. These results suggest that regardless of region, wealth, or intensity of the civil war, 
countries that use a TJM mechanism are more likely to have higher levels of democratization and 
human rights. 
 Table 3 – TJM vs. no TJM 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 DV: Democracy 
(Polity IV) 
DV: Human 
Rights (CIRI 
Empowerment) 
DV: Human 
Rights (CIRI 
Physical Integrity) 
DV: Human 
Rights (Political 
Terror Scale) 
TJM .011 * 
(.972) 
.003* 
(.568) 
.005* 
(.336) 
.012* 
(.164) 
War Deaths .501 
(.000) 
.520 
(.000) 
.890 
(.000) 
.939 
(.000) 
GDP per capita .074 
(000) 
.275 
(.000) 
.494 
(.000) 
.013* 
(.000) 
Region .233 
(.503) 
.623 
(.295) 
.308 
(.175) 
.571 
(.085) 
 
 
 
 Four additional regression models also support the argument that war crimes tribunals 
have a greater influence that truth commissions (see Table 4). Model 5 includes the tribunal 
variable, the truth commission variable and the three control variables predicting the Polity IV 
democracy scale. Only the tribunal variable – not truth commissions – was a significant 
predictor. Model 6 includes the same five independent variables predicting the Political Terror 
Scale. The tribunal variable and per capita GDP – but not truth commissions – were significant 
predictors. Model 7 includes the same variables predicting the CIRI Empowerment Scale. As in 
Model 6, only the tribunal variable was a significant predictor. Model 8 includes the same 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 **, p<0.01 
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variables predicting the Physical Integrity Index. Again, only the tribunal variable was a 
significant predictor.  
 Table 4 – War Crimes Tribunal vs. Truth Commission 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 DV: Democracy 
(Polity IV) 
DV: Human 
Rights (CIRI 
Empowerment) 
DV: Human 
Rights (CIRI 
Physical Integrity) 
DV: Human 
Rights (Political 
Terror Scale) 
War Crimes Tribunal .029* 
(1.442) 
.005* 
(.828) 
.003* 
(.486) 
.003* 
(.233) 
Truth Commission .387 
(1.663) 
.404 
(.948) 
.687 
(.556) 
.762 
(.267) 
War Deaths .479 
(.000) 
.477 
(.000) 
.985 
(.000) 
.840 
(.000) 
GDP per capita .090 
(.000) 
.300 
(.000) 
.525 
(.000) 
.014* 
(.000) 
Region .271 
(.524) 
.660 
(.299) 
.263 
(.176) 
.646 
(.084) 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The transitional justice literature makes important claims about the effectiveness of TJMs 
in facilitating democratic transitions and increasing respect for human rights. Advocates argue 
that TJMs are effective facilitators of democratization and human rights for a variety of reasons: 
1) they help establish the truth about past human rights abuses; 2) they provide validation, 
closure, and justice for victims; 3) they hold human rights abusers accountable and potentially 
deter future abuse; 4) they contribute to the development of the rule of law; and 5) they help 
reconcile competing groups and establish a durable peace. This paper focuses on a subset of 
countries undergoing democratic transitions – post-civil war societies – and provides cross-
national empirical support for these arguments regarding TJMs. This study shows that post-civil 
war countries that have used a TJM have higher levels of democratization and human rights than 
post-civil war countries that have not used a TJM. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05 **, p<0.01 
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The results also show, however, that war crimes tribunals are more effective than truth 
commissions. The post-civil war countries that used a war crimes tribunal have higher levels of 
democratization and human rights than post-civil war countries that used a truth commission. 
Each TJM pursues a different logic – war crimes tribunals emphasize justice, punishment and 
deterrence; and truth commissions emphasize reconciliation and peace. Those who prefer war 
crimes tribunals criticize truth commissions as “compromise justice” because they do not 
guarantee accountability for human rights violators. The critics argue that truth commissions 
often do not have access to all the evidence and generally do not have the power to implement 
their own recommendations. Thus, they are not effective facilitators of democracy and human 
rights in post-civil war situations. The results of this study support those arguments. 
 There are many reasons to tentatively interpret both of these results. There are a range of 
other possible reasons not included in this study why post-civil war societies may enjoy 
increasing levels of democratization and human rights – the situation in neighboring countries, 
the colonial legacy of the country, the level of international support, the level membership in 
international organizations, whether the regime or the rebels win the civil war, the level of 
power-sharing in the post-civil war settlement, among others. It is possible that some 
combination of these other factors more directly influence democratization and human rights 
levels, and the countries that are more likely to have higher levels of democracy and human 
rights are also more likely to use TJMs in a post-civil war setting. The current evidence in favor 
of TJMs in general and tribunals in particular has not reached the point of strong policy 
advocacy. For example, we cannot confidently say that tribunals would aid Syria’s post-civil war 
levels of human rights and democratization.  
15
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The tentative nature of these results also applies to the findings regarding truth 
commissions. Post-civil war truth commission have been implemented in a wide variety of ways; 
perhaps some are more effective than others. Perhaps different TJMs are more appropriate in 
different contexts, and truth commissions can be effective in other democratic transition contexts 
other than civil wars. Overall, however, these results show that truth commissions in a post-civil 
war context are a ‘half-measure’ that do not effectively lead to increased levels of 
democratization and human rights. War crimes tribunals, though, were consistently a good 
predictor throughout this study. This suggests that if a country wants higher levels of democracy 
and human rights after a civil war, it should not have unpunished war criminals in its society. 
Establishing the rule of law, even with the risk of alienating groups and reducing the chances for 
peaceful reconciliation, is often a more effective way to increase democracy and human rights. 
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